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The evolution of the Japanese Self-Defense Force 
(JSDF) over the past fifty years has created debate in 
Japan's Parliament over its legality, purpose, direction 
and normalization. The JSDF appears to be taking steps to 
"normalize." If so, what are the indicators and have any of 
the steps been achieved? This thesis analyzes the trends of 
the JSDF in its evolution from a National Police Reserve to 
a self-defense force as to the roles and missions that it 
has chosen to accept or reject. Also, the issues that arise 
out of Article 9 in Japan's Constitution are examined to 
determine if there is a conflict in interpretation. Japan's 
major political parties' views on Article 9 and the JSDF 
are presented in order to determine where they stand on the 
issues. Japan's regional neighbors and their possible 
reactions to a normalization of the JSDF are presented, in 
addition to other factors that will either aid or impede 
the normalization of the JSDF. Finally, recommendations 
regarding the United States' approach to engaging a 
normalized Japan are presented. The basic conclusion of the 
thesis is that Japan will normalize the JSDF and United 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the event of a regional crisis in Eastern Asia and 
the Western Pacific, Japan’s participation in coalition 
operations may be pivotal to a successful United States 
military effort. The scope of this thesis will be to 
provide a framework for determining the likelihood of Japan 
assuming roles and missions at the request of the United 
States based on various political-military factors. 
As a major economic and potential military force in 
East Asia, Japan is in a unique position to support and 
provide direct military assets to any type of regional 
crisis. Due to events in the last few years, Japan has 
increasingly stepped up its level of participation in 
coalition operations, up to and including deploying troops 
to Iraq as part of the humanitarian and reconstruction 
effort taking place there following the United States led 
effort in the Global War on Terrorism. These activities may 
set the stage for greater Japanese participation in areas 
adjacent to its home islands. 
A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
In order to evaluate what sets of political-military 
factors may yield certain outcomes in terms of Japanese 
participation, this thesis shall assess the comparative 
national interests of Japan, China, Taiwan, the two Koreas, 
Russia and Southeast Asia. Given these various sets of 
political-military factors, what are the possible scenarios 
that may evolve as a result? The hypothesis that shall be 
examined is: if current Self-Defense Force operations are 
successful and favorable legislation is passed to support 
enhancing Japan’s military capability, then the United 
2 
States can expect Japan to participate in more and further 
expanded roles and missions in future coalition operations. 
The basic approach to be utilized is comparative case 
studies comparing Japan to its neighbors within the context 
of a U.S. influenced strategic situation. The independent 
variable will be the requests that the United States 
Government would ask for in a military operation. The 
dependent variable would be the possible roles and missions 
that Japan assumes in reaction to U.S. pressures. The 
intervening variable is the various combinations of 
political-military factors stemming from other countries’ 
interests. A level of analysis approach will be taken to 
examine factors at the domestic politics and alliance 
levels. The opinions of experts on Japanese foreign 
relations from books, official reports and interviews will 
be utilized.  
B. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 
II will provide a history and background of the Japanese 
Self-Defense Force and the roles and missions that it has 
and has not participated in since its creation to determine 
whether trends exist. This chapter will look at the 
capabilities of the JSDF. What is Japan’s current military 
capability? What are their planned capabilities? Do these 
planned capabilities support the roles and missions that 
Japan and the United States may want to conduct? 
Chapter III will analyze the domestic policies level. 
The ongoing policy debate regarding Japan’s Self-Defense 
Force will examine the following: Is there a proposal for 
legislation to allow preemptive attacks? What is the status 
of the initiative to reinterpret the Japanese 
3 
Constitution’s Article 9? What impact will this have on its 
ban on collective defense? Who supports revising Article 9 
of the Constitution and who does not? What are the issues 
surrounding the revision of Article 9?  
Chapter IV will examine the histories and 
relationships that Japan has had with the People's Republic 
of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic 
of Korea, Taiwan, Russia and Southeast Asia. These 
countries national interests will be compared to those of 
Japan's to determine if they are congruent and parallel or 
if there is any disparity between Japan becoming a "normal" 
country. Questions, such as, “What are Japan’s national 
interests? Do these interests conflict with other 
countries’ national interests?” will be addressed. Long and 
short-term factors that will either aid or impede the 
revision of the Constitution's Article 9 will be presented 
based on the research in chapters II – IV. 
Chapter V will summarize the findings and present 
conclusions and apparent trends. Recommendations for what 
United States should do to either assist or observe will 
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF JAPAN'S SELF DEFENSE 
FORCE 
The defense of Japan is primarily the mission of its 
Self-Defense Force. Created initially with the intention to 
deal with internal, domestic affairs,1 the Self-Defense 
Force's role has expanded to include the defense of the 
nation from regional threats, humanitarian and disaster 
relief in Japan, regional operations other than war, out-
of-region operations other than war, humanitarian and 
disaster relief out-of-region and regional crisis response.2 
The history of Japan's Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is an 
important aspect of its transformation from a purely self-
defense force to a "normal" military. This chapter will 
examine the JSDF's history in order to determine how that 
history will affect the JSDF's future roles and missions in 
and out of Northeast Asia. This chapter will begin by 
looking at the period of the American Occupation following 
World War II and the environment that was in place at the 
time of the creation of the JSDF. General Douglas 
MacArthur's policies would have a dramatic impact on the 
type, size and purpose of the JSDF. Next, the creation of 
the National Police Reserve, the forerunner of the JSDF, 
and its roots in the Japanese Constitution will be 
examined. The roles and missions that the JSDF has chosen 
to accept or not accept will be considered to determine if 
a trend is emerging in the types of roles and missions that 
                     
1
 Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-armed, (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1986), 31. 
2
 Torkel Patterson, Future Roles and Missions of the Japan self-
Defense Forces, Prepared for a conference: Restructuring U.S Japan 
Relations. Okazaki Institute/Pacific Forum CSIS Tokyo. January 11-13, 
1996. 
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it chooses to pursue. This will be important in analyzing 
the evolution of the JSDF's role from a guarantor of 
internal security to its participation in out-of-region 
operations other than war. Finally, these trends will be 
analyzed on a historical, military and political level to 
try and determine the next phase of the JSDF's development. 
The last section of this chapter will present some of the 
key ideas to understand regarding the JSDF's steps towards 
transformation. 
A. THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION 1945-1952 
The American Occupation of Japan began at the 
conclusion of World War II and officially lasted until 
1952. (However, there are some who would argue that because 
there are still a large number of United States military 
bases and armed forces stationed there, the occupation has 
not really ended.3) At any rate, General MacArthur was 
appointed the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and 
was responsible for the mission of rebuilding post-war 
Japan. General MacArthur had a vision of turning Japan into 
"the Switzerland of the Far East," a vision to make Japan 
both rich and neutral.4 Thus, General MacArthur's policy 
thrusts focused on economics and on demilitarizing Japan. 
The attitude that Americans had toward Japan would have an 
                     
3
 Chalmers Johnson, a prominent specialist in Japanese affairs, is 
an outspoken opponent of "American Empire." He has authored a number of 
books including Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American 
Empire, and The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of 
the Republic [The American Empire Project]. Most recently Johnson 
penned an article for the Los Angeles Times on 18 February 2004 in 
which he quotes an acquaintance and former official of Japan's Ministry 
of Education and now a university president, "We are still occupied by 
the American military." Johnson goes on to call Okinawa a "Pentagon 
colony" during its 25-year occupation from 1955-1972 and states that 
presently there are still some 38 U.S. military bases on the island. 
4
 Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-armed (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1986), 19. 
7 
important impact on the types of policies that were made 
and the impact of these policies on Japanese society. 
The Allied treatment of Japan at the conclusion of 
World War II was far different than the treatment Germany 
received. The reasons are many, however, here are a few 
probable ones. The lack of ties by Americans to the 
Japanese in any large numbers was one of the major reasons 
that Americans treated the Japanese far harsher than they 
did the Germans even though Americans citizens recognized 
fewer of the Japanese hierarchy than compared to Germany.  
At the Tokyo Tribunal on Japanese war crimes only 
[Prime Minister] Tōjō and the Emperor [Hirohito] 
were identifiable to the American public and, 
although in 1945 70 per cent of Americans 
supported punishment without trial for the 
Emperor, he was never tried.5 
The war trials illustrated the strong American dislike 
of the Japanese compared to the Germans. In one particular 
trial, where both the United States and Britain required 
unanimous verdicts in order for the death sentence to be 
carried out, seven of the charged Japanese men were hung on 
a vote of only seven to four. War trials were also held in 
Germany; however there was no ambiguity in the voting that 
would cause any questions to be raised later. This 
inconsistency seems counter to General MacArthur's declared 
policy of turning Japan into a "peaceful, just and affluent 
society - a symbol of world peace."6 This apparent lack of 
consistency could be contributed to the Americans' stronger 
dislike of Japan than Germany. 
                     
5
 Ibid, 19. 
6
 Ibid, 20. 
8 
The intensity and method of the fighting in the 
Pacific campaign is another reason for the harsher 
treatment that the Japanese received. The fighting in the 
Pacific was ferocious and Americans faced an enemy that 
would rather fight to the last man than to surrender. This 
warfighting mentality was not something that Americans had 
experienced in the European theater and thus made the 
Japanese seem to be as blood-thirsty and violent as 
characterized in the American wartime, anti-Japanese 
propaganda film Know Your Enemy, Japan. It was aptly put in 
the film that "we will probably never know the tough little 
mind of the Japanese completely."7 Another indicator of the 
ferociousness of the Pacific campaign was the Japanese 
tactic of Kamikazes. First used in the Battle of Leyte 
Gulf, the Kamikazes inflicted horrible death and damage to 
U.S. ships and their crews. The climax of the Kamikaze 
attacks was in the American invasion of Okinawa, where over 
1,900 suicide attacks occurred and of those 355 in a two-
day period. This aspect of the war was yet something else 
that Americans were not accustomed to. 
[T]here was stunned disbelief on the part of 
American sailors that other men would be willing 
to kill themselves in order to destroy them.8 
The image of the Japanese was not made any better by the 
stories that filtered back to the Americans about the way 
that the Japanese treated their prisoners and especially 
women. Stories were often told of the mistreatment of 
prisoners and how they were pressed into slavery. The 
Japanese treatment of women was of particular distaste to 
                     
7
 Ibid, 19. 
8
 Robert A. Germinsky, The Divine Wind: Japanese Kamikazes 
(Washington, D.C.: Navy & Marine Corps WWII Commemorative Committee, 
1993), 2. 
9 
Americans since the Japanese pressed female prisoners of 
war into service as prostitutes for the Japanese Army as 
their own female population from back home began getting 
scarce.9  
General MacArthur's economic policies echoed President 
Wilson's earlier declaration to American businessmen. 
Carry liberty and justice and the principles of 
humanity wherever you go, go out and sell goods 
that will make the world more comfortable and 
more happy, and convert [these people] to the 
principles of America.10 
Thus, the idea of opening up Japan's markets to the world 
economy became a primary policy pursuit for General 
MacArthur. His approach was not new by any means; Commodore 
Perry and his Black Ship Fleet had done this in the past. 
Perry had been sent to Japan to "bring to Japan an era of 
enlightenment and progress."11 General MacArthur focused on 
the break-up of big business conglomerates or zaibatsu that 
had dominated the economic landscape that led to World War 
II. 
Japan's system of "private property," he 
(MacArthur) asserted, permitted ten family groups 
comprising only fifty-six families to control 
directly or indirectly every phase of slavery of 
the remainder of the Japanese people, permitted 
higher standards of life only through sufferance, 
and in a search of further plunder abroad 
furnished the tools for the military to embark 
upon its ill-fated venture into world conquest.12 
                     
9
 Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2000), 655. 
10
 Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-armed (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1986), 20. 
11
 Ibid, 21. 
12
 Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2000), 686. 
10 
He believed deconstructing the economic structure that 
had existed prior to and during the war would enable Japan 
to refocus its economy towards a more peaceful end. 
Although General MacArthur attempted to break-up the 
zaibatsu, he ultimately succeeded in breaking up only 28 of 
the original 1,200 that he had targeted. The staunchness of 
the Japanese to retain their holdings and influence on 
economic matters could not be stymied by General MacArthur, 
however the form that they would take, keiretsu - a network 
of firms centering around one of the great banks, was the 
result of his antimonopoly measures.13 
The demilitarization aspect of General MacArthur's 
policy was to remove any influences that could continue or 
restore the previous military regime. When American 
occupation forces arrived on the island, they were 
surprised by the lack of resistance and almost warm welcome 
they received. This could probably be explained by the fact 
that Japan had experienced fifteen years of "psychological 
pressure" and eight years of "wartime conditions" which had 
essentially left them "spiritually drained."14 The general 
attitude of common Japanese citizens towards their 
government and military was that they were inseparable. The 
Emperor was the mysterious, deified leader of the people 
that had only spoken to the public once, at the formal 
radio speech surrender of Japan. Japanese citizens 
cultivated dependence or amaeru on the Emperor and their 
parents that would later be transferred to Americans and 
                     
13
 Ibid, 688. 
14
 Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-armed (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1986), 21. 
11 
later still diminish altogether.15 This complete integration 
of military and political forces made it difficult for 
General MacArthur to weed out the dissidents, thus some 
180,000 people from various administrative and business 
positions were removed from their positions if they were 
suspected of being right-wing, nationalistic or 
militaristic.16 The intent of this policy was to limit the 
ability of Japan to remilitarize to any degree near the 
level of its pre-war status. This pursuit of limiting 
Japan's military potential will be discussed further within 
the context of the Constitutional restraints. 
Further changes during the occupation period saw the 
reformation of the education system, the enfranchisement of 
women, and land reform. Although these changes were 
significant, they will not be discussed in any great detail 
here. What is important to note is the political and 
cultural environment that was created because of the 
policies that were in place at the time of the creation of 
the JSDF. Since General MacArthur’s focus was on the 
economy and demilitarization, the National Police Reserve 
did not get the attention that it deserved and it was not 
until four years after the American Occupation that the 
JSDF began to direct its own course. Thus, the JSDF was 
born in a time that saw little use for a “military”-type 
                     
15
 For an excellent study of Amae refer to Takeo Doi's The Anatomy 
of Dependence (1973, Kodansha International, San Francisco). His book 
provides an in-depth study of the Japanese sense of self-indulgence or 
the need to fit in with one's surroundings. This feeling is at first 
individualized and then can be seen permeating all levels of social 
interaction up to ties with the Emperor. In this particular case the 
average Japanese citizens' need to feel that they are a part of their 
country, similar to a type of pseudo-nationalism. 
16
 Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-armed (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1986), 22. 
12 
force and the focus of the country was on the economy and 
rebuilding while security was left to the United States. 
B. FROM NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE TO SELF-DEFENSE FORCE 
As mentioned in the introduction the National Police 
Reserve was the forerunner to the modern day JSDF. Created 
in 1950 at the behest of the United States, the original 
force was 75,000 strong. Created to fill the absence of the 
United States' forces that were deployed to Korea as a 
result of the Korean War, the National Police Reserve's 
role has since shifted from internal domestic affairs to 
encompass a much broader range of roles and missions. In 
1954, the National Police Reserve was renamed the National 
Security Agency and subsequently the National Defense 
Agency and then finally the Self-Defense Force.17 
The origins and controversies of the Self-Defense 
Force lay in Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution. Adopted by 
the Japanese at the urging of American authors, the 
Japanese Constitution has echoes of the United States’ own 
Constitution. The ideas of “life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness,” “all men created equal” and the separation 
of church and state can all be seen as direct examples of 
concepts taken from the United States’ Constitution.18 These 
ideas are further refined in the unique, peaceful aspect of 
Japan’s Constitution in Article 9. 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as a means 
of settling international disputes. In order to 
                     
17
 Michael D. Bellows, ed., Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving 
Strategic Priorities, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1994.), 171. 
18
 Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-armed (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1986), 28-29. 
13 
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea and air forces as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
[Emphasis added]19 
This single article has been a point of contention for 
the Socialist Party of Japan (JSP), which argued that the 
legality of the JSDF is highly questionable given the 
phrasing of Article 9. Despite the debate, the JSDF's mere 
existence today suggests that the socialist party was not 
fighting a winning battle and furthermore there are 
discussions to revise or even completely do away Article 9. 
These discussions have been amplified by the September 11 
terror attacks on the United States. This is discussed 
further in the next section. 
In 1957, the first Defense Buildup Plan was announced 
and has been followed subsequently by additional plans 
every five years. The course of the JSDF is highly 
regulated.  However, there is an outside factor that must 
be taken into consideration, namely Japan's ties to the 
United States in the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. 
This treaty places a restriction on the JSDF of only being 
a force that is defensive in nature.20 This places the bulk 
of the responsibility for the external security of Japan on 
the United States. This arrangement has benefited the 
Japanese economy enormously because Japan has had to spend 
relatively little on its defense budget, the United States 
has continued to promote international trade with Japan and 
because of direct access for Japan to the American markets 
                     
19
 The Constitution of Japan. 
20
 Michael D. Bellows, ed., Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving 
Strategic Priorities, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1994.), 173. 
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and technology.21 One reason for the tremendous economic 
boom that the Japanese economy experienced was the "Yoshida 
Doctrine." Simply put, this policy focused on the opposite 
of its pre-war policy of military buildup, which is 
economic investment in technology and trade in order to 
develop Japan's economic power. In 1951, then-Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru signed two treaties that would set 
the stage for Japan's economic development. First, the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty laid the foundation for its release 
from occupation and pledged their alliance to the U.S. 
during the Cold War. Second, the Security Treaty gave the 
U.S. military basing facilities in Japan in exchange for 
external security while not committing to aid the U.S. if 
it came under attack. The next few years would solidify the 
policies that Yoshida had put in place. Whenever an 
advocate of focusing on security instead of economics 
attempted to tip the balance, something would occur that 
would favor the economics side. For instance, in 1960, when 
then-Prime Minister Kishi tried to push through a revised 
security treaty he was called "undemocratic" and a protest 
that had been organized around the Diet (Japan's 
Parliament) ended with the death of one of the protestors. 
Americans interpreted this to mean that the situation was 
too unstable for a revised security treaty to be signed and 
thus elected not to go ahead as planned.22 Most importantly 
for the success of this doctrine was its appeal to the 
people, economic growth and recovery while strengthening 
                     
21
 Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2000), 754. 
22
 Leonard Schoppa, "Japanese Domestic Politics: The Challenge of 
Turning off the Cruise Control" Foreign Policy Research Institute, 
Professor Schoppa spoke on this topic at FPRI’s History Institute on 
Teaching About Japan, October 19-22, 2003. 
15 
the alliance with the United States, which in turn would 
increase the overall value of Japan to the United States, 
making it worthwhile to protect.23 The lack of emphasis on 
defense or military matters was also important because 
after the years of "pressure and strain" that the Japanese 
had endured up to and including the war, they were ready to 
focus on something different. 
All of this has been true up to the end of the Cold 
War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the perception 
of threats around Japan from the Soviet Union has all but 
disappeared and with it the United States’ level of support 
for protecting Japan from a Soviet threat. The United 
States’ demand now is that Japan begin to take more 
responsibility for its own protection. Thus, the roles and 
missions of the JSDF that were originally meant to only 
protect the country in self-defense have seen an expansion 
as discussed in the next section. 
C. ROLES AND MISSIONS 
The roles and missions that the JSDF has chosen to 
either accept or not indicate the level of commitment that 
it is willing to make towards becoming a more "normal" 
country. This section will cover the operations that the 
JSDF has participated in and furthermore will differentiate 
between military and non-military roles and missions. The 
distinction is important in evaluating whether Japan is 
maintaining its pacifist stance or if it is coming out of 
its "shell" and taking a more active role as a major player 
in world affairs. 
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1. Military Roles and Missions 
The first and foremost military operation that will be 
discussed is the Korean War. As stated earlier, the 
National Police Reserve was created as a direct result of 
American troops being pulled out of Japan to mobilize in 
Korea. The initial mission of the National Police Reserve 
was to "cope with internally fomented Communist 
insurrection."24 Thus, the National Police Reserve did not 
directly contribute to any combat action in Korea. However, 
there were Japanese participants in the Korean War who were 
in the employ of the United Nations Command as paid 
contractors.25 This particular operation did not feasibly 
offer the opportunity for Japan to get involved because of 
the sensitivity of its history of annexation in Korea. The 
idea of sending Japanese troops was considered but 
ultimately deemed a bad idea by Prime Minister Yoshida.26 
The role of the Japanese in the Korean War was therefore 
limited to contract-type work versus any active military 
roles or missions. Also, at the request of the United 
States, Japan resumed production of defense equipment to 
support the United Nations Command in the Korean War.27 
The next military operation was the Vietnam War. 
Again, Japan did not have any direct involvement but did 
provide basing support for the United States.28 In addition, 
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the production of defense equipment was again requested by 
the United States and Japan answered the call.29 What is 
important to note in both of these cases is that Japan did 
not contribute any personnel or equipment from  its own 
forces and what was provided was at the request of the 
United States and was bought and paid for, whether it was 
equipment or services. Another important aspect is that 
during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Japanese 
economy benefited heavily from U.S. investments in 
equipment, services and from troop spending while on Rest 
and Recuperation (R&R). 
The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 was another possible 
regional contingency that the JSDF could have chosen to 
respond to. While the United States Seventh Fleet was 
deployed to monitor the situation, Japan stated that it was 
committed to maintaining the United States-Japan alliance, 
however, could not support the United States in the form of 
ships, aircraft or personnel because of Constitutional 
restraints. 
Potentially the most controversial military operation 
that Japan did not participate in was Desert Storm. 
Although, Japan contributed almost $13 billion to the 
coalition effort, later to be known as "checkbook 
diplomacy," it did not contribute any personnel or 
equipment even after intense diplomatic pressure by the 
United States.30 This would be a negative international 
image that would stick with Japan until the September 11 
terror attacks in the United States. Operation Southern 
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Watch directly followed Desert Storm and Japan did make a 
minimal military contribution in the form of minesweepers 
deployed to the Arabian Gulf.31 
The next military operation that the JSDF has 
participated in is Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). When 
the September 11 terror attacks in the United States had 
concluded, Japan’s leaders called for an extraordinary 
session of the Diet to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law.32 This allowed for up to three escort ships, 
two supply ships, 1,200 Maritime Self-Defense Force 
personnel, six transport aircraft, two multipurpose 
aircraft and 180 Air Self-Defense Force personnel to be 
allocated and deployed in areas in Pakistan, the Indian 
Ocean, Diego Garcia, Australia, Guam as well as in Japanese 
territory. Although these units and personnel were not 
authorized to take part in any direct combat operations, 
their missions were in the support roles of supply, repair 
and maintenance, medical services and seaport services.33 
The JSDF forces were crucial in re-supplying Allied ships 
and other non-Japanese units that were participating in the 
Arabian Sea, a designated hostile fire zone.34 This dramatic 
increase in participation in OEF can be seen as Japan’s 
attempt to cast off the negative image it acquired with its 
“checkbook diplomacy” in Desert Storm. The September 11 
terror attacks could also be seen as a unique opportunity 
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for Japan to seize the initiative in enhancing its Self-
Defense Forces missions outside of Japan. Without the 
attacks the ability for Prime Minister Koizumi to push for 
legislation allowing the JSDF to participate in missions 
outside of Japanese territory and more specifically in 
military related operations would probably have been much 
more difficult. Also, as alluded to earlier, the terrorist 
attacks and continuing war on terrorism may serve as an 
impetus to allow for legislation to either alter or delete 
Article 9 altogether from the Constitution.35 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is the most recent 
military operation that the JSDF has participated in. 
Legislation was passed in July 2003 to allow 1,000 members 
of its Ground Self-Defense Force to assist with rebuilding 
in Iraq. The actual deployment of those troops was mired in 
political and real world hang-ups. The most probable 
explanation of this is due to Japan's "Five Principles" 
that stipulate Japan's participation in OIF is dependent 
upon the following conditions being met: 
1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached 
among the parties in conflict. 
2. Parties under conflict, including its territorial 
states(s), shall have given their consent to the 
deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan’s 
participation in that force. 
3. The peacekeeping force shall maintain strict 
impartiality, without favoring any of the parties in 
conflict. 
4. Should any of the above requirements cease to be 
satisfied, Japan’s unit must be able to withdraw 
from the operation. 
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5. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum 
necessary to protect personnel’s lives.36 
The issue that arose out of the non-deployment of 
these forces is that a cease-fire had not been established 
and even today random bombings and shootings are occurring 
in Iraq. Also, the possibility of Japanese troops being 
drawn into some type of conflict had delayed the deployment 
of troops. However, despite resistance from opposition 
parties, Prime Minister Koizumi was finally able to get the 
legislation required passed through the lower house of the 
Diet.  Additionally, Japan has offered $1.5 billion in 
reconstruction aid and more at a later date.37 The extent to 
which Japan will offer to keep its Self-Defense Forces in 
Iraq will probably depend on the extent of the fighting 
that is still occurring, the duration of the reconstruction 
period and the will of the Japanese people to support their 
troops in Iraq. 
2. Non-Military Roles and Missions 
The non-military roles and missions that Japan’s Self-
Defense Force have participated in began in 1992 and can be 
seen as a result of its nonparticipation in Operation 
Desert Storm. Because of its lack of participation in 
Operation Desert Storm and its minimal participation as 
noted earlier in Operation Southern Watch, Japan took steps 
to immediately increase its participation in United Nations 
(UN) Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Relief 
Operations. Japan was also motivated by its allies to 
become a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
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Council. A 1997 bid alongside Germany to gain a seat at the 
council had the support of the United States but ultimately 
the bid failed.38 As recently as May 2003, the United 
States, France, and Britain provided “solid backing” for 
Japan’s bid to gain a coveted seat on the council.39 
Beginning in September 1992 the Japanese Self-Defense 
Force has been involved in UN peacekeeping operations in 
Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and East Timor and 
has authorized forces for a UN peacekeeping mission in Iraq 
when conditions warrant.  The range of participation has 
included personnel and components from the Ground, Air, and 
Maritime Self-Defense Forces. International humanitarian 
relief operations include operations in Rwanda, East Timor 
and Afghanistan, again to include personnel and components 
of the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces. Below is a list 
of the operations that Japan and the JSDF have participated 
in. 
Peacekeeping Operations 
• Cambodia (UNTAC), September 1992- July 1993: 
Cease fire observers, Civilian police officers, 
two engineer units, two transport and one supply 
ship, six C-130Hs. 
• Mozambique (ONUMOZ), May 1993 - January 1995: 
five staff officers, 3 movement control units, 
one C-130H. 
• Golan Heights (UNDOF), February 1996 - present: 
two staff officers, one transport unit, one C-
130H. 
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• East Timor (UNAMET), August 1999: three civilian 
police officers. 
• East Timor (UNTAET/UNMISET), October 1999 - 
present: 10 headquarters staff personnel, one 
engineer unit, one transport and one escort ship, 
one C130H. 
International Humanitarian Relief Operations 
• Rwandan refugees, September - December 1994: GSDF 
medical personnel, C-130H. 
• East Timorese Displaced Persons, August 1999: Air 
transport. 
• Afghan refugees, October 2001: six C-130H 
transports and two coordination and liaison 
personnel.40 
Japan has increased its level of participation in both 
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief operations. There is 
an apparent increase in the level of participation since 
1991 which would indicate that given the proper situation 
and possibly diplomatic pressure from the United States, 
Japan may be willing to participate in more coalition 
operations, however, that remains to be seen and will be 
discussed in the conclusion. 
D. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JSDF 
United States Joint Forces Command defines 
transformation as the process of changing form, nature or 
function.41 Transforming the JSDF is an enormous step in 
changing the role of the JSDF from a self-defense force to 
a full-fledged military. However, transforming the JSDF is 
not simply restating its missions and then executing them. 
The JSDF is mired in politics and Japan's unique 
Constitution and more specifically Article 9, makes 
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transforming the JSDF a contentious issue in Japan. 
Understanding the form, nature and function of the JSDF is 
essential to understanding its transformation. 
1. Form 
In 1950, at the behest of the United States, Japan was 
told to create a National Police Reserve consisting of 
75,000 men to take the place of United States' forces that 
were engaged in fighting the Korean War. The original 
purpose of the National Police Reserve was to deal with a 
potential communist uprising.42 In 1954 the National Police 
Reserve was renamed the National Security Agency and 
subsequently the National Defense Agency and then finally 
the Self-Defense Force.43 The simple changing of the name of 
the JSDF over time implies that its form has changed as 
well, from a "National Police Reserve" that implies 
handling domestic issues and problems to a "Self-Defense 
Force" that is intended to maintain the safety and security 
of the nation from both domestic and external threats. The 
JSDF has evolved to include ground, air and maritime 
components that can operate jointly although they mostly 
operate independently of one another. 
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is probably the 
most forward thinking of the services. It has participated 
in various operations and exercises with the United States 
and is consistently involved in Peacekeeping Operations. 
The MSDF has been involved in RIMPAC, ANNUALEX, and the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium.44 The MSDF has deployed 
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units to participate in Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia 
and East Timor.45 The JMSDF has enjoyed staying apace with 
technological leaps as demonstrated by a maritime force 
that is ranked in the top ten of the world's navies. 
Specifically of note are its Kongo Class, Aegis Guided 
Missile Destroyers, Harushio Class submarines and P-3Cs. In 
addition the JMSDF seeks to add a new destroyer class as 
well as two new aircraft carriers.46 The JMSDF is probably 
the most formidable naval force in the Pacific second only 
to the United States. 
The Air Self-Defense Force is second to the JMSDF in 
participating in combined exercises. The ASDF routinely 
participates in exercises with the United States and has 
participated in every Peacekeeping and International 
Humanitarian Relief Operation since Japan became involved 
in these in 1992. The ASDF has sent units to Cambodia, 
Mozambique, the Golan Heights and East Timor in support of 
Peacekeeping Operations and to Rwanda, East Timor and 
Afghanistan in support of International Humanitarian Relief 
Operations.  The ASDF was the first of the three services 
to arrive in the Middle East in support of the United 
States-led effort to rebuild Iraq. The ASDF also enjoys 
having relatively modern equipment to include F-15s, E-2s, 
and C-130s. The ASDF is also planning to purchase and build 
the new Joint Strike Fighter. 
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The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is probably the 
least revolutionary of the three forces. Its equipment is 
fairly modern including Type 90 tanks and Type 89 fighting 
vehicles, however, joint operations and combined exercises 
outside of Japan rarely occur and only engineering and 
medical units of the GSDF have participated in Peacekeeping 
and International Humanitarian Relief Operations. The GSDF 
is making headway in participating in reconstruction 
efforts in Iraq, beginning with a 30-man advance team 
deployed to Kuwait City in late January 2004 to make 
preparations for the 550 GSDF personnel that are scheduled 
to arrive in April 2004. Since their arrival, an additional 
90 troops have arrived and been deployed to Samawah.47 
2. Nature 
The evolution of the nature of the JSDF began at the 
end of World War II. In 1947 Japan adopted what would 
become its modern day Constitution. The most important 
aspect of the Constitution that applies to the defense of 
Japan is Article 9. Thus, the nature of the JSDF was 
established at its birth with Article 9. This pacifist 
stance that Japan has taken on military matters may have 
been appropriate for the post-war period, however in 
today's changing security environment it is necessary for 
the JSDF to change its nature and look beyond mere self-
defense. Article 9 acts as a barrier on the potential of 
the JSDF. 
The reevaluation of Article 9 has occurred once in 
1976 and again in the 1980s. In 1976 it was determined that 
Japan would not have to rely solely on the United States 
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for its defense but that Japan's forces could respond to an 
attack on a limited scale. In the 1980s it was again re-
evaluated that in the event of a wider conflict that the 
United States' support could not be wholly counted on.48 The 
legality of the JSDF has also raised questions in Japan. 
The Japanese Socialist Party questions the existence of the 
JSDF given the phrasing of Article 9 and wishes to either 
eliminate the JSDF or reword Article 9. 
3. Function 
The function of the JSDF is the most controversial 
issue for Japan. While most people in Japan believe in, and 
more importantly like, the idea of the pacifist nature of 
the constitution, events such as the September 11 terror 
attacks on the United States are an all too bitter reminder 
of the Japan's own terrorist attacks in 1995 by Aum 
Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subways and that Japan is just as 
susceptible to attack as any other country in the world. 
However, while the United States military is prepared to 
respond to an event like the September 11 terror attacks, 
the JSDF had little if any involvement in responding to the 
Tokyo subway attacks. The JSDF has participated in search 
and rescue operations and relief operations in the JAL 
flight 123 crash in 1985 and the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 
in 1995. While on paper the function of the JSDF is clear, 
namely the defense of the nation, in reality the JSDF has 
done little more than provide a deterrent to would-be 
aggressors in the region. The JSDF instead participates in 
disaster and relief operations and combined exercises with 
the United States while putting on public awareness and 
community events in attempts to bolster its own image. 
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However, the current North Korea nuclear issue is beginning 
to put in question what the function of the JSDF should be 
in the event of the threat or use of nuclear weapons by 
North Korea. This will be examined more thoroughly in 
chapter 4. 
E. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY 
The establishment of the JSDF came from a request by 
the United States and has been constantly "nudged" by the 
same to take some new direction. In the period immediately 
following its creation, the JSDF has evolved from coping 
with aggression within its own borders to deterring it in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980s saw a period where the 
attitude of Japan shifted from its Meiji Restoration slogan 
of "rich country, strongly armed" to "rich country, 
strongly protected" as it began to see the benefits of the 
United States - Japan Security Alliance. However, this did 
not prevent them from shifting their mentality from 
strictly "self-defense" to "comprehensive security." This 
shift would be a downturn for the normalization of the JSDF 
because "comprehensive security" places equal emphasis on 
all instruments of national power; diplomatic, information 
and economic, not just the military. Thus, the JSDF did not 
receive the attention it desired for increasing its roles 
and missions since the other instruments of national power 
were being stressed. The United States – Japan Security 
Alliance was also a reason not to focus on the JSDF since 
the United States could provide military support when 
necessary. The 1990s was a breakout decade for the JSDF 
beginning in 1991 with Operation Desert Storm. Despite not 
having contributed any actual units or personnel, a roughly 
$13 billion monetary contribution to the coalition efforts 
helped Japan cement its position in the international arena 
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as a nation that could be a key contributor to any type of 
cause. Also, during this decade, Japan made a giant leap 
into the United Nations' Peacekeeping and International 
Humanitarian Relief Operations, signaling that Japan was 
not going to just sit on the sidelines anymore. The 
September 11 terror attacks were probably the single most 
important impetus towards reforming the role of the JSDF. 
Immediate legislation was enacted and Japan began sending 
JSDF units to directly participate in the Global War on 
Terror. As the war in Iraq concluded, Japan again took a 
bold step in announcing that JSDF troops would be sent to 
help in the rebuilding of Iraq. The deployment of those 
troops signals a big step from Japan’s traditional 
nonparticipation stance so criticized after Operation 
Desert Storm. Thus, one can see that from its inception to 
the present, the JSDF has been taking steps to becoming 
more of a participant in coalition operations. What is 
interesting to note, from an East Asian perspective is that 
of all the roles and missions that the JSDF has 
participated in, none of them have been in East Asia. 
Perhaps this is an indicator of Japan's reluctance to 
overstep its boundaries by putting Japanese troops in any 
Northeast Asian countries, given Japan's history in the 
area. Another possibility is that Japan is trying to build 
up "credit" prior to participating in any roles and 
missions in Northeast Asia so as not to "startle" its 
neighbors. Finally, Japan may be counting on the United 
States to take care of Japan's neighbors while Japan is 
busy assisting the United States and the United Nations in 
other parts of the world. 
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What is apparent in Japan is its emphasis on the 
JSDF's contributions in non-combatant types of roles and 
missions. Japan is eager to point to the JSDF's assistance 
in the JAL flight 123 crash in 1985 and the Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake in 1995. While emphasizing the importance of the 
JSDF's non-combatant roles, the Japanese Defense Agency 
(JDA) is simultaneously decreasing the size of its standing 
forces. The JDA intends to reduce the number of its ground 
forces from 180,000 to 160,000 troops, 60 to 50 ships, 220 
to 170 maritime aircraft and 350 to 300 combat aircraft.49 
The JDA is emphasizing an increase in the technology and 
quality of its forces and has in its budget in the next 
several years the construction of two aircraft carriers and 
a new type of "destroyer" that would increase its at-sea, 
air rotary wing aircraft capability. These steps can be 
seen as following in the footsteps of the United States 
military that is moving away from being a size dominant 
force to a light, lethal, mobile and technologically 
superior force. 
The JDA seeks to build more streamlined, 
effective and compact defense, while acquiring 
necessary capabilities and making qualitative 
improvement. Steady defense build up is 
indispensable for secure and peaceful society.50 
This statement taken from the current Defense Program 
from the JDA highlights the push to modernize and acquire 
new capabilities that will only expand the types of roles 
and missions that Japan can participate in. However, merely 
possessing the capabilities is not reason enough for the 
JSDF to become more involved internationally. The question 
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of legality, authority and the will of the people will 
continue to be issues for Japan. Thus, the trends appear to 
point to Japan taking a more active role in coalition 
operations, however, when those roles and missions will 
begin taking place in East Asia is still in question. 
The form, nature and function that the three services 
have evolved into are the result of the operations and 
exercises that they have participated in over the years. 
The form that the JSDF has taken in present day is a result 
of its origins in the National Police Reserve. It has grown 
into three services that now look beyond Japan's own 
borders and has grown in size and in the equipment that 
possesses and utilizes. Meanwhile the nature of the JSDF 
was well established in 1947 but has been questioned since. 
The Self-Defense Force should be defensive in nature, 
however, is it legal to have a Self-Defense Force when the 
Constitution stipulates not maintaining any military 
potential? Finally, the function of JSDF as a force to 
maintain the safety and security of Japan has seemed to do 
many things beyond that. While participating in 
Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Relief 
Operations around the world, the JSDF has yet to 
participate in any within East Asia possibly due to the 
fact that the closest United Nations operations would have 
been in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Also, Japan has 
faltered when asked to contribute to coalition operations 
such as Operation Desert Storm, whereas a substitute to 
sending personnel and equipment, Japan instead played 
"checkbook diplomacy," contributing some $13 billion to the 
coalition effort. 
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The transformation of the JSDF involves an 
understanding of where the JSDF presently stands and where 
it wants to go. However, simply knowing where to go does 
not mean that the path will not be difficult. In the JSDF's 
situation, the Constitution is the single largest factor in 
determining if the JSDF can change to meet new roles and 
missions. Article 9 needs to be either revamped for the 21st 
Century or deleted from the Constitution completely. The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
terrorist threat require that the JSDF be able to respond 
to new roles and missions that were not the focus of the 
Cold War era. Instead, the JSDF must adapt and keep up with 
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III. THE HISTORY AND DEBATE OF JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION  
The Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is poised to 
potentially make the greatest transformation since its 
creation from a limited form of self-defense force to a 
full-fledged military. This would represent an 
extraordinary shift in the roles and missions that the JSDF 
chooses to participate in and where those missions take 
place. However, the road to transformation is not without 
its obstacles. The greatest obstacle in the way of the 
JSDF's transformation is Japan's own Constitution. Japan's 
Constitution, specifically Article 9, explicitly prohibits 
maintaining "land, sea, and air forces as well as any other 
war potential."51 Thus, the very existence of the JSDF has 
been an issue of heated debate from the time of its initial 
formation as the National Police Reserve to its present 
form. The history of the Constitution, Article 9 and the 
political debates surrounding both are issues that are 
still being fought over today. The first section of this 
chapter will present the Government of Japan's current 
interpretation of the Constitution with regard to Article 
9, followed by the arguments for the Government of Japan to 
either revise or reinterpret Article 9 and to either expand 
the current missions of the JSDF thereby legitimizing the 
JSDF, dissolve the JSDF or maintain the status quo. The 
supporters, opponents and their motivations for revising or 
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A. ARTICLE 9 
Japan formally adopted its present Constitution on May 
3, 1947.52 However, it was a Constitution that was written 
by Americans and there is still some debate as to whether 
it was readily accepted by the Japanese or forced upon 
them. Regardless of the origins of the Constitution, the 
fact remains that the Japanese have lived by it for the 
last 57 years and have done so with little modification to 
the original document. Article 9 of the Constitution, 
otherwise known as the "no war clause," or "renouncement of 
war clause," is what gives the Constitution its pacifist 
nature and its nickname, "the Peace Constitution." The 
Government of Japan (GOJ) has laid out strict and exacting 
definitions of Article 9 based on their interpretations 
that dictate the existence, limits and use of the JSDF. The 
Defense of Japan 2002 White Paper justifies the existence 
of the JSDF and gives the GOJ's interpretations of Article 
9 in relation to the Constitution, self-defense and the 
type and amount of self-defense capability permitted. The 
following will layout the basic interpretations and 
restrictions of Article 9 and the resulting effects on 
Japanese policy. The text of Article 9 is quoted in chapter 
II. 
The first issue that arises out of the text of Article 
9 is the very existence of the JSDF. The phrase "land, sea 
and air forces as well as other war potential, will never 
be maintained," would seem to suggest that in purely 
legalistic terms the JSDF should not be allowed to exist 
since to any casual observer the JSDF is a type of land, 
sea and air force, although not in name. The name "Self-
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Defense Force" strictly spells out the role of the JSDF, 
that of self-defense. And the mission of self-defense would 
be the argument that those in favor of the JSDF would make 
to support the present and continued existence of the JSDF, 
while its opponents would say that merely the name of JSDF 
does not preclude it from being an "armed force." The GOJ 
upholds the interpretation that while Article 9 does 
embrace pacifism through its renouncement of war, non-
possession of war potential and rejection of the right of 
belligerency, the right of self-defense is not denied and 
is inherently maintained so long as Japan is an independent 
nation and a sovereign state. Thus, the justification of 
the existence of the JSDF is to "possess the minimum level 
of armed strength needed to support the exercise of that 
right (self defense)." 53 Thus, semantics plays a role in 
the existence of the JSDF, if the JSDF were to be renamed 
to any type of "armed force," then its opponents would have 
cause to further pursue the arguments in abolishing the 
JSDF's existence. 
The question of the "minimum necessary level of armed 
strength" is the subsequent question that arises from the 
interpretation above. While "war potential" is forbidden, 
the GOJ states that while the actual level may vary 
dependent upon "the international situation, the standard 
of the available military technology and various other 
factors," the possession of certain weapons such as 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), long-range 
strategic bombers or offensive aircraft carriers are 
explicitly denied because of their offensive capabilities 
and more specifically for their ability to bring wholesale 
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destruction to another country.54 What is important to note 
is that the sum total of Japan's military strength should 
not exceed the constitutional limit or in other words the 
"minimum necessary level of armed strength" that is 
required for self-defense.  
The next issue addressed is the set of the conditions 
that must be met in order for the JSDF to exercise its 
right of self-defense. The Defense of Japan White Paper 
spells out three conditions where armed force might be 
used: 
1. There is an imminent and illegitimate act of 
aggression against Japan; 
2. There is no appropriate means to deal with the act 
of aggression other than by resorting to the right 
of self-defense; and 
3. The use of armed strength is confined to the minimum 
necessary level.55 
These conditions exist to reinforce the idea that the 
JSDF is to be used for self-defense only and not to be used 
in any type of offensive manner, which is supported by its 
ban on offensive weapons. These conditions clearly show 
that Japan's security must be at risk, violence is the last 
resort and that proportionality must be exercised. This 
issue is carried into the next question of "what are the 
limits of geographical boundaries that the JSDF can operate 
within?" 
The Defense of Japan White Paper acknowledges that the 
actual boundaries of an operation would vary on a case-to-
case basis. However, it is clear in pointing out  
The Government believes that the Constitution 
does not permit the dispatch of armed troops to 
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foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for 
the purpose of using force, because such an 
overseas deployment of troops would generally go 
beyond the limits of the minimum necessary level 
of self-defense.56 [Emphasis added] 
This is an issue that is being hotly debated today 
with the Government's decision to dispatch troops in 
support of the reconstruction of Iraq. As of March 7, 2004, 
Air Self-Defense Force (AJSDF) and Ground Self-Defense 
Force (GJSDF) personnel are operating in Kuwait and Iraq. 
Additional GJSDF personnel are scheduled to arrive in April 
2004. This marks the first time that Japanese troops have 
been deployed to an area that is experiencing fighting 
since World War II.57 
The issue of the right of collective self-defense is 
the next question that is raised. While Japan acknowledges 
that international law recognizes the right of collective 
self-defense as the right of a state and that Japan is a 
sovereign state, it should follow that Japan has the right 
of collective self-defense. However, the Government 
believes that the right of collective self-defense would be 
overstepping the boundaries of the "minimum necessary level 
of armed strength" to protect itself. Thus, Japan believes 
that if a country that is an ally were under attack, Japan 
would not be able to come to the aid of that country since 
it is not in defense of Japan itself but rather another 
country.58 Shortly after taking office in April 2001, Prime 
Minister Koizumi had considered the idea of revising 
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Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense, but then 
realizing that a constitutional revision would take some 
time, opted for a Diet resolution instead as a temporary 
measure to get the country comfortable with the idea of 
collective self-defense before pushing through with a 
revision.59 
The last issue is the right of belligerency. Article 9 
clearly states that the Japan will not recognize 
belligerency as one of its rights. The Government provides 
a definition of what is meant by the "right of 
belligerence", 
The general term for the various rights a 
belligerent nation has under international law, 
including the authority to inflict casualties and 
damage upon the enemy's military force and to 
occupy enemy territory.60 
It is not meant to be the right to "exchange 
hostilities." What is important to note is that this 
interpretation does give way to the fact that the right of 
self-defense, as well as collective self-defense, are 
"quite separate from the exercise of the right of 
belligerence."61 
B. ALL THOSE IN FAVOR... 
The JSDF's first transformation was only four years 
following its initial creation as the National Police 
Reserve in 1950, when it was renamed the National Security 
Agency. Eventually it would acquire its modern name as the 
Self-Defense Force and along with it the responsibilities 
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of quelling threats from not only within Japan's borders, 
but being prepared to handle those from outside its borders 
as well. Thus, in the JSDF's 54-year history it has already 
undergone a tremendous transformation, from dealing with 
only internal threats to a much larger scale and magnitude 
of external threats. 
However, despite the new responsibilities that the 
JSDF has accepted, there was little that the JSDF could do 
to actually execute those responsibilities. Article 9 
prohibited the very existence of the JSDF and bureaucrats 
were very wary to even assign the JSDF a mission that could 
be seen as somewhat militaristic. Thus, the JSDF enjoyed a 
somewhat protected position, a position of being 
responsible for the defense of Japan but without having to 
really do anything unless there was an actual attack 
against the homeland. Instead they focused on search and 
rescue and humanitarian assistance operations within their 
own borders (e.g., JAL flight 123 crash and the Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake). This represents quite a different 
mindset from that of Japan's security partner the United 
States. Whereas the United States was willing to commit 
combat power to any conflict that the United States had a 
national interest, such as Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 
1965, Japan was not willing to contribute any military 
power even if there were Japanese national interests at 
stake. The best example of this was during Operation Desert 
Storm.  Japan did not contribute any combat equipment or 
personnel but instead contributed $13 billion to the 
coalition effort. Obviously, this was a case where one of 
Japan's national interests was clearly at stake, oil. At 
the time of Operation Desert Storm, Japan imported 
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approximately 46% of its oil from the Middle East.62 As of 
September 2003 that figure, as reported by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry had risen to upwards of 91.5%.63 
This represents an enormous interest for Japan to take part 
in operations that would most likely affect the lives of 
ordinary Japanese citizens. 
Despite this lack of willingness to participate in 
operations outside of Japan, changes within the last decade 
indicate that Japan is beginning to move towards an 
expanded role for the JSDF. In 1992 legislation was passed 
that allowed for participation in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations.  This was the first step in authorizing the 
JSDF to conduct operations outside of Japan. In 1999, Japan 
signed a Regional Contingency Security Law that spelled out 
how Japan would respond and what assistance would be 
offered to the United States if an emergency arose in areas 
surrounding Japan.64 In 2001, then-Prime Minister Mori 
signed legislation that would allow Japanese troops to 
carry arms during UN Peacekeeping Operations. Japan's 
current Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) has made the biggest gains for the 
JSDF as far as expanding its roles and missions. Koizumi 
ran for office on the platform of "change the LDP, change 
the nation." He rallied for the recognition of the JSDF as 
a military and a revision of the constitution to legitimize 
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the JSDF. He also emphasized that a true and equal security 
alliance with the United States was crucial to Japan and 
for lifting Japan's ban on collective self-defense.65 Since 
Koizumi took office, he has brought forward a number of 
initiatives that have advanced the JSDF's move towards 
increasing its roles and missions and becoming a more 
"normal" military. The first initiative followed the 
September 11 terror attacks against the United States. The 
initiative, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law gave 
the JSDF the right to shoot at suspicious vessels "in order 
to stop them."66 During the recent September 2003 LDP   
elections, all four of the LDP candidates supported 
revising Article 9. All of the candidates agreed that 
Article 9 was too vague and needed to more clearly 
stipulate the role of the JSDF and be worded so that people 
could understand it more easily. One of the candidates, 
Shizuka Kamei said that there were 23 existing 
interpretations of Article 9.67 The most recent initiative 
is the deployment of Japanese civilians and JSDF personnel 
in the reconstruction of Iraq. The deaths of two of Japan's 
diplomats stalled the actual deployment of those troops. 
However, Koizumi stresses that  
If we wash our hands of it just because it is 
dangerous and there is no safe place there, it 
means that we are giving in to terrorists, 
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in regard to his decision to still send troops despite the 
volatile security situation.68 The trend of initiatives 
appears to indicate that the LDP is pushing for more roles 
and missions for the JSDF, transforming it into a true 
military and becoming a true security partner with the 
United States.  
The New Komeito Party, which is currently aligned with 
the LDP, wants to maintain Article 9, but would like to see 
a ten-year period on national consensus building before 
deciding to revise the Constitution. They believe that the 
maintenance of the Japan-United States security treaty and 
self-defense of Japan lie at the heart of Japan's defense 
strategy. One difference from the Democratic Party of Japan 
is that the New Komeito Party does endorse participating in 
UN Peacekeeping Operations.69 
C. ...AND THOSE OPPOSED 
Despite the headway that Koizumi has made, there are 
those in Japan that would like nothing more than to see the 
JSDF completely dissolved in accordance with the explicit 
direction of Article 9. Japan's Socialist Party was a major 
proponent of arguing that the existence of the JSDF is 
illegal as spelled out by Article 9. However, in 1993-1994, 
the Socialist Party recognized the JSDF as legitimate 
within the framework of the Constitution in exchange for 
one of its members, Toiichii Murayama, being named Prime 
Minister. Since then and after changing the party’s name to 
the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP), they have given 
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notice that they may change their stance and term the JSDF 
as "almost unconstitutional" and making it their goal to 
abolish the Japan-United States security treaty. They also 
want to revise Article 9 to more clearly articulate its 
antiwar stance.70 
On January 21, 2000 the Japanese Parliament began a 
five year review of the Constitution, with its purpose to 
decide if the Constitution needs revision and if so where. 
The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) argues that 
the JSDF should not be transformed into a full-fledged 
military but instead should be scaled back to only the 
"minimum necessary force" to exercise self-defense of the 
country. The DPJ believes that in order for the right of 
collective self-defense to be recognized, a major revision 
of the Constitution is required not just a 
reinterpretation, thus completely countering the original 
intent and nature of the Constitution. The DPJ does not 
believe in participating in any operations outside of 
Japan, collective self-defense, or any type of offensive 
operations.71 The DPJ is the biggest opponent against 
revising the Constitution. The DPJ recently won 177 seats 
during the November elections, up from 137.72 The DPJ’s 
stance on the Constitution and the SDF is one of the 
reasons that the DPJ is gaining the popular support to 
minimize the role of the JSDF or completely do away with 
it. 
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The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is the staunchest 
supporter of maintaining the Constitution as it is. 
However, in the recent elections in September 2003, the JCP 
saw its number of seats drop from 20 to nine. Despite its 
announcement in July of 2003 to recognize Japan's Imperial 
system and the JSDF, voters were not swayed and the final 
tally reflected it. The JCP is also opposed to the troop 
dispatch as well as the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.73 
D. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY 
The interpretations of Article 9 presented here seem 
to somewhat overlap and contradict each other at points. 
One can see the vicious cycle of reasoning that is used to 
justify the JSDF's existence and purpose, self-defense but 
only with the "minimum level necessary." Thus, the level of 
total military strength should be adequate to provide that 
end, however what is the determinant for the "minimum level 
necessary?" The conditions of when to exercise self-defense 
seem clear enough, however, the location to exercise it is 
vague and can change from case-to-case. The right of 
belligerency is not recognized, however, the right of self-
defense, which could include "inflicting casualties and 
damage upon the enemy's military force," is recognized. 
These questions and contradictions are at the heart of the 
debate over Article 9 and the question to revise, 
reinterpret or leave it as it is. 
The issue of revising or reinterpreting the 
Constitution is so contentious that there is hardly anyone 
that does not either favor or oppose a change to the status 
quo. In a recent poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun 
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newspaper, of 1,036 people polled only nine percent were in 
favor of still sending troops to Iraq after the deaths of 
the two Japanese diplomats and their driver.74 The same poll 
shows that 80% wanted the deployment of troops either 
cancelled or delayed until the security situation could be 
stabilized and 43% were outright opposed to deploying any 
troops at all regardless of the security situation.75 There 
is a serious divide in what roles and missions the JSDF 
should participate in as evidenced by the poll. The SDP 
argued for some time that the JSDF should not exist at all, 
although that stance has softened somewhat recently. 
Meanwhile, the DPJ argues that the JSDF should remain a 
self-defense force limiting its roles and missions to the 
geographical location of Japan for the purposes of defense 
only. The LDP argues that the natural evolution of the JSDF 
is to become a full-fledged military and a participant in 
operations alongside its security partner, the United 
States, and other allies wherever Japan's national 
interests may lay or if an ally is being threatened. 
Regardless of what Japan decides, its regional neighbors 
and the United States will be watching closely because the 
transformation of the JSDF into a full-fledged military 
will be an event truly worth watching and one that will 
affect the security situation in Northeast Asia as well as 
the rest of the world. 
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IV. JAPAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ITS NEIGHBORS’ 
POSSIBLE REACTIONS 
Japan's history in Asia has been somewhat less than 
spectacular, although that perception has become more 
positive in recent years. Japan's history of aggression and 
occupation has affected almost all of the countries that 
will be discussed in this chapter. Japan's greatest 
perceived threat is from North Korea. The launching of a 
Taepodong missile over Japan, the spy boats incident, the 
mothership incident and most recently North Korea's adamant 
refusal to give up its nuclear program are all reasons for 
Japan transforming its SDF into a full-fledged military. 
But the physical threats of North Korea are not the only 
reasons for the transforming the JSDF. 
A. JAPAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Japan's national interests obviously lay in its 
security and continued prosperity while also engaging the 
world diplomatically, economically and "militarily." 
Japan's greatest ties to its neighbors are economically and 
historically. Japan's relations with its Northeast Asian 
neighbors go back centuries, thus it is difficult to view 
Japan as a singular nation without looking at the 
consequences of any actions taken by Japan on its 
neighbors. When the Cold War came to an end, Northeast Asia 
as well as the rest of the world expected that "the peace 
dividend" had finally arrived. Japan looked to increase its 
economic and security relations with the rest of the world. 
Japan once again embarked on a course to develop 
"comprehensive security" using its powerful economic 
engine. However, the post-Cold War era was not to be as 
generous as the Cold War era was. The world community was 
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not going to tolerate Japan's "free-riding" as evidenced by 
the world's reaction to its "checkbook diplomacy." 
Therefore, Japan has embarked on a careful course of 
engagement, taking incremental steps, as laid out in 
chapter 2, which will allow it to eventually become a 
"normal" nation. However, those steps must be tempered by 
the reactions of Japan's allies and neighbors. 
B. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan 
celebrated the 30th anniversary of their normalization in 
2002. The relations between China and Japan continue to 
grow stronger, especially economically. China has surpassed 
the United States as the number one exporter to Japan and 
Japan is China's largest trade partner.76 As the economies 
of China and Japan become more interdependent, the 
importance of the security of the sea-lanes and keeping 
goods and services flowing will increase in Northeast Asia 
as well. Despite the growing economic relations, there are 
still issues from the past that affect present day economic 
relations. One of the more recent downturns in Japan – 
China economic relations was the loss of a bid by the 
Japanese to build a railroad in China. The project was to 
build a high-speed rail between Beijing and Shanghai, 
however, the bid will probably go to a French rival 
supposedly because of Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.77 The Yasukuni Shrine is 
dedicated to the approximately 2.5 million people who have 
died in Japan's conflicts between 1853 and 1945, including 
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14 Class A war criminals from World War II. Critics of the 
Prime Minister's visits to the shrine say that the visits 
symbolize the government's approval of previous war 
criminals' acts. 
While China is important to Japan as a trading 
partner, China also represents the greatest competition 
economically, militarily and potentially politically to 
Japan. While Japan remains the greatest economic power in 
Asia, China has had a larger percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product growth over the past several years and shows no 
signs of slowing down.78 China has also become the world's 
top recipient of foreign direct investment, receiving over 
$30 billion in the first six months of 2003.79 Militarily, 
China has the largest standing army at just over two 
million troops and continues to modernize its military. 
China has recently announced that its military spending in 
2004 would rise 11.6 percent over the 2003 budget of 185.3 
billion yuan (22.37 billion dollars).80 
The success of China's economy is largely due to 
China's newest generation of leadership, spearheaded by PRC 
President Hu Jintao. The fourth generation leadership has 
been characterized as "the technocrats" because of their 
extensive backgrounds in engineering and economics.81 The 
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success of China's economy may suggest that there is a 
shift occurring in China from the previous Chinese 
Communist standard to some as yet to be determined form of 
capitalism. Such a shift in China's political system could 
spell trouble for Japan's prospects of remaining the lead 
goose in the flying geese model. The United States would 
also welcome a capitalist China that is sowing the seeds of 
democracy. The United States’ previous objections to 
establishing relations with China had primarily been 
because of China's Communist nature and because of China's 
human rights violations82. However, because of the headway 
that China is making economically, with China being granted 
Permanent Normal Trade Relations by the United States in 
2000 and gaining membership into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, it would appear that the United 
States' stance on China is shifting. China would therefore 
benefit from the United States turning away from Japan and 
recognizing an emerging "democratic" China as the new, 
regional, military and economic power. 
As China continues to grow economically and modernize 
militarily, it has the potential to become the regional 
hegemon and potentially become the next superpower to 
compete with the United States. Thus, it would not bode 
well for China to have a fully "normalized" Japan in such 
close proximity to China. Japan would present greater 
competition as a "normalized" country with the ability to 
project power and not be restricted by its Constitution. 
Furthermore, it would be most beneficial for China if Japan 
stayed under the United States’ security blanket, then 
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China could focus on the United States as its major 
competitor knowing that Japan was "under the United States’ 
thumb." Even though China advocates a “multipolar” world,83 
it would be difficult envisioning military relations 
between Japan and China. However, the United States could 
decide to support a full "normalization" of Japan in order 
for it to balance China in Northeast Asia. On the other 
hand, a normalized Japan could be used as a balance by 
China against the United States as well. 
C. THE TWO KOREAS 
The two Koreas both share a common history with Japan 
up until the end of World War II. Korea was annexed by 
Japan in 1910 and remained so until the end of World War II 
when Allied forces liberated it. However, at the conclusion 
of World War II the future of Korea was yet to be decided 
and the nation was separated at the 38th parallel, the 
North to be administered by the Soviet Union and the South 
by the United States. This particular division has impacted 
both of the Koreas’ relationships with its neighbors and 
other countries in the Asia. 
1. Republic of Korea 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is probably Japan's 
closest bother-in-arms in the sense of a shared Mutual 
Defense Treaty between Japan and the United States and the 
Republic of Korea and the United States. This "virtual 
alliance" between the ROK, Japan and the United States 
creates an interesting dilemma for the ROK if Japan 
normalizes its defense establishment. The ROK lists its key 
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diplomatic tasks on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade's website as: 
1. Peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
issue. 
2. Policies toward Iraq and the Middle East. 
3. Strengthening of the ROK-US alliance. 
4. Economic and trade foreign policies in response to 
increasing openness in the global economy. 
5. Promotion of cooperation with the international 
community. 
6. Fostering of a favorable environment for the 
establishment of a durable peace regime on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
7. Laying the groundwork for the development of Korea 
into an economic hub in Northeast Asia.84 
Based on this list of interests it is fairly easy to see 
that Japan's involvement cannot be underestimated. One can 
see that all the tasks will somehow involve Japan in one 
way or another, whether it be politically, economically or 
in a worst case scenario "militarily" - that worst case 
being a North Korean nuclear scenario. Japan has become the 
ROK's number two trading partner directly behind China. As 
mentioned in the PRC section, with the economies of the 
ROK, PRC and Japan becoming more interdependent it will 
become increasingly important to protect the flow of goods 
and services within and to and from the Northeast Asian 
region. In all of Asia, Northeast Asia represents by far 
the largest volume of trade. The ROK and Japan are deeply 
interested in maintaining and improving their economic 
relations. "Militarily" speaking, Japan and the ROK have 
taken steps to improve their military-to-military 
relations. ROK naval ships visited Japan for the first time 
in 1994 and JMSDF ships made a port call to Pusan in 1995.85 
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Additionally, in 1999 the JMSDF and the ROK Navy held their 
first combined exercises in Pusan.86 Despite the headway 
that the two navies have made, there is some hesitation on 
Japan's part to have its GSDF participate in combined 
exercises with the ROK marines and army since the GSDF has 
no marines and because of Japan's history of military 
aggression on the Korean Peninsula. 
The ROK is extremely sensitive to the military balance 
of power in Northeast Asia with the United States’ 
intention to downsize its force posture in the ROK. While 
United States military forces are stationed in the ROK to 
serve as the catalyst to United States involvement in the 
event of an invasion from the North, the withdrawal of 
those forces would significantly decrease the United 
States' desire to get involved in a military conflict on 
the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, one could make the case 
that a "normalization" of the Japan Self-Defense Force 
could foster the creation of a Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the ROK and Japan that would be beneficial to both 
parties involved if the United States were to substantially 
reduce its forces in or withdraw its forces from the ROK. 
2. Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea is probably Japan's 
greatest perceived threat. The DPRK continues to be a "wild 
card" in Northeast Asian security matters by being the most 
unpredictable of the Northeast Asian countries. The DPRK's 
national interest could probably be summed up as follows: 
1. Survival of the Kim Jong Il regime 
2. International legitimacy 
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3. Form lasting economic, diplomatic and security      
relations 
4. Independence/Reunification 
Based on this list of national interests, it is 
necessary to look at the history of relations between the 
DPRK and Japan. The relations between the DPRK and Japan 
over the last few years could be characterized a "two steps 
forward and then a tumble." Despite somewhat warming 
relations, a series of events have worked to upset any 
normalization talks. On August 31, 1998, the DPRK test 
launched a Taepodong-1 medium range ballistic missile over 
Northern Japan that fell harmlessly into the Pacific Ocean. 
The missile is believed to have an effective range of 1,500 
– 2,000km, putting most of Japan within its range. The DPRK 
claimed that the missile was actually carrying its first 
ever satellite, the Kwangmyongsong No.1 spacecraft, to be 
launched into orbit. Despite the DPRK's claim no 
information has ever been received from the satellite and 
Western tracking systems have not detected it in orbit.87 As 
a direct result Japan suspended food aid to the hunger-
stricken DPRK and said that aid would not resume until the 
DPRK had taken positive steps towards stemming its nuclear 
and missile development programs.88 
On March 22, 1999, two North Korean spy boats 
disguised as trawlers were detected in the Sea of Japan 
within the territorial waters of Japan. This incident, in 
addition to the Taepodong missile incident, proved to 
further inflame relations between North Korea and Japan. 
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Despite being pursued by the Maritime Safety Agency and the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force, the two boats were able to 
escape back into the northern port of Chongchin in North 
Korea. This incident also had a further noteworthy aspect; 
it was the first time in the JMSDF's existence that they 
opened fire for reasons other than self-defense. The 
Cabinet had given the order to the JMSDF to stop and 
inspect the boats after which the JMSDF destroyers opened 
fire with their 5" guns and JMSDF P-3C aircraft dropped 
150-kg warning bombs in an effort to stop the boats for an 
inspection.89 
December 22, 2001 signified a further deterioration in 
Japan – DPRK relations with the sinking of a suspicious 
vessel southwest of Kyushu. The vessel was first detected 
on December 21 and determined to be similar to the two 
boats that escaped in the March 1999 incident. The Defense 
Agency ordered the Japanese Coast Guard to pursue and 
detain the vessel for questioning. After ignoring queries 
to stop, the Japanese Coast Guard fired warning shots and 
was met with return fire from rifles and rocket launchers. 
The Japanese Coast Guard returned defensive fire resulting 
in the sinking of the vessel. There were no survivors and 
only two bodies were recovered (of a suspected crew of 15). 
The vessel was only recently salvaged by Japan with the 
help of China and all evidence seems to point to North 
Korea as being the origin of the vessel.90 
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In September 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited 
North Korea in a prelude to what looked like a new round of 
normalization talks. In a surprise move regarding the long 
standing issue of the Japanese abductees, the Dear Leader 
Kim Jong Il admitted and apologized face-to-face to Prime 
Minister Koizumi in an extremely rare, first-time meeting 
of both leaders in Pyongyang. "It is regretful and I want 
to frankly apologize," Kim said, adding that the culprits 
had been identified and punished.91  However, a month later 
the positive aspects of the momentous summit would be 
overshadowed by the revelation in October 2002 that the 
DPRK was again developing its nuclear weapons program. The 
abductee issue remains a top priority for Japan as 
evidenced by the separate talks concerning the abductees 
that have occurred in conjunction with the six party talks. 
"That is priority number one as far as we are concerned," 
said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima at a 
press conference regarding the Japanese foreign ministry 
visit to North Korea.92 
The DPRK faces increasing difficulty in its relations 
with Japan. The loss of food aid, diminishing trade and 
diplomatic hardships all serve to hamper normal relations 
between the DPRK and Japan. The reaction to a normalization 
of Japan, from a North Korean perspective, is the most 
difficult to gauge given its history of unpredictability. 
However, it would be fair to say that to the DPRK, Japan is 
the United States' regional "deputy" and rightly so. 
Currently Japan pays: 
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1. The costs for the Facilities Improvement Program for 
areas to be used by United States Forces Japan 
(USFJ) 
2. Labor costs for USFJ employees locally employed 
3. Utility costs for public use by the USFJ 
4. Costs for the relocation of training at the request 
of the Japanese side.93 
Consequently, these expenses could be seen as "payment" to 
the United States for aiding in Japan's defense, primarily 
from the threat posed by North Korea. Thus, while the 
United States' responsibility is for protecting Japan from 
its neighbors, Japan is responsible for supporting the 
United States in that responsibility. 
The DPRK could view the normalization of Japan from 
two sides. First, a normal Japan would be out from under 
the "security blanket" of the United States and could look 
to strengthen its relations in Northeast Asia to include 
the DPRK. Additionally, it would bode well for the DPRK to 
have greater access to Japan's economy, markets, technology 
sector and allies. Second, the DPRK could be the target of 
a newly normalized Japan that sees the value of a pre-
emptive military operation against a bellicose neighbor 
with a history of unpredictable and aggressive behavior and 
react with either the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons. Additionally, the ties between the ROK and Japan 
as discussed earlier could become stronger presenting a 
less favorable environment for the long-term survival of 
North Korea. Conversely, Japan could choose to sever its 
ties with the ROK, although that is highly unlikely given 
the existing strong economic ties and the relationship with 
their mutual ally the United States. 
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Another avenue that the two Koreas could pursue is 
reunification. A reunified Korea could either turn to form 
its closest relations with Japan and the United States or 
with the PRC. If a reunified Korea turns to Japan and the 
United States, then the normalization of Japan would 
enhance the security and economic positions of all three 
nations. However, if it turns to the PRC, then the PRC and 
reunified Korea would want Japan to maintain its status quo 
relations with the United States in order to prevent a 
independent arms race between a unified Korea and Japan. 
D. TAIWAN 
Taiwan was ceded to Japan by China as a result of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 that ended the Sino-Japanese 
War. Japanese imperial rule lasted for the next fifty years 
until the end of World War II. Taiwan presents an 
interesting situation for Japan.  Economically, Taiwan is 
Japan's fourth largest trading partner. Politically, Japan 
maintains working relations on a non-governmental basis in 
accordance with the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué. 
Taiwan's national interests are not unlike any other 
country. President Chen Shui Bian makes clear two goals for 
Taiwan, security and independence.   
To safeguard national sovereignty and defend 
national security is my solemn duty, as is my 
commitment to allow the people of Taiwan to be 
masters of their own land.94 
In order to accomplish his goals of security and 
independence there are two major accomplishments that 
President Chen identifies, democracy and economics, as the 
cornerstone for international recognition and eventual 
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independence.95 These major accomplishments are not too 
dissimilar from Japan's own accomplishments. Additionally, 
Taiwan's goals are not unlike what Japan has achieved. 
Taiwan would probably welcome a "normalized" Japan in 
that Taiwan could work to improve relations with Japan and 
perhaps use those ties to gain independence from China. 
However, that would put Japan at risk by severing its ties 
with China. Also, a "normalized" Japan could detract the 
interest of China from Taiwan, allowing Taiwan to progress 
more steadily towards independence particularly if Japan 
and Taiwan were to sign a mutual security treaty. Japan’s 
support as a normalized military against an aggressive PRC 
could be a welcome addition to Taiwan’s security. However, 
this situation could also worsen China-Taiwan tensions if 
Beijing perceived Japan as a threat. Japan's view of the 
Taiwan-China issue is that while not outright pledging to 
aid Taiwan in a cross-straits crisis, Japan's ties to the 
United States would obligate Japan to support the United 
States in a military operation involving the defense of 
Taiwan. Ultimately, Japan would like to see the China-
Taiwan situation resolved peacefully.96 
E. RUSSIA 
Like the PRC and ROK, the ties between Russia and 
Japan are growing stronger. In January 2003 Japan and 
Russia announced the Russian–Japanese Plan of Action, a 
bilateral plan that 
[E]nvisages, among other things, considerable 
strengthening of cooperation in the international 
arena, continued negotiations on the question of 
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concluding a peace treaty, positive shifts in the 
field of trade-and-economic cooperation, the 
development of cultural ties, and the deepening 
of trust and understanding between the peoples of 
Russia and Japan.97 
Russia has received approximately $6.59 billion from Japan 
in the form of loans, grants and trade insurance since 
November 1990.98 Economically, Russia depends on the trade 
generated by Japan and foreign direct investment (Japan 
ranks sixth among foreign investors) while Japan looks to 
Russia for its future energy sources. On matters of 
security Russia and Japan see almost eye-to-eye on the 
DPRK. 
Russia and Japan are active and keen participants 
in the negotiating process on the questions of 
resolving the Korean situation. We have common 
objectives - the necessity to ensure the nuclear-
free status of this sub-region and to maintain 
the regime of security and nonproliferation 
there, as well as to achieve this by peaceful 
means.99 
Thus, economically and diplomatically, Russia and Japan 
share similar goals in Northeast Asia. 
Although Russia and Japan share many economic, 
diplomatic and strategic goals there remain some issues 
that are unresolved. One of those issues is the rightful 
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possession of the Kurile Islands. However, with the Ikurtsk 
Statement of 2001, reaffirming the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint 
Declaration and the 1983 Tokyo Declaration, both countries 
have agreed to settle the issue of the islands so that a 
peace treaty could be signed.100 With the economies of both 
China and Japan recovering from the 1997–1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis, Russia has once again begun to engage 
both countries economically and diplomatically. Russia is 
focusing on restructuring its domestic economy, however it 
is keeping an eye on its regional neighbors. 
F. SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
Japan first established informal ties in 1973 and then 
formalized relations in 1977. Japan has been quite active 
in economic and development cooperation throughout 
Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia's greatest tie to Japan is 
economically. ASEAN and Japan have implemented the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in order to further 
develop economic ties between Japan and ASEAN seeking to 
increase the total amount of trade between the two to $40 
billion by 2020.101 Japan also has ongoing working group 
level discussions with all the members of ASEAN for 
developing an economic partnership with each respective 
member, however only Singapore and Japan have signed a 
Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement of a New Age Partnership 
(2002). Security-wise, in December 2003, Japan acceded to 
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, a  
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treaty that essentially commits the signatory states to 
respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all countries.102  
Southeast Asia, while having economic dealings with 
Japan and only recently the beginnings of strategic 
cooperation, is more than likely to accept Japan's bid for 
normalization if only to provide a balance of power with 
regards to China. While ASEAN has deeper roots with China, 
the addition of Japan to its list of friends and trading 
partners would give ASEAN greater economic access to the 
United States through Japan and vice versa. Japan's history 
of aggression and occupation in Southeast Asia serves as 
constant reminder to Southeast Asia what a "militarized" 
Japan is capable of. However, a 1998 public opinion poll 
indicated,  
An overwhelming majority of respondents saw Japan 
as a trustworthy partner that would not become a 
military threat.103 
Therefore, the possibility exists that a normal Japan would 
be welcomed by ASEAN. 
G. FACTORS AFFECTING THE NORMALIZATION OF THE JSDF 
There are several factors that could affect the full 
normalization of the JSDF. This section will examine those 
factors in a short and long term context. 
1. North Korean Nuclear Issue 
The North Korean nuclear issue continues to be the 
most critical issue with regard to the security of 
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Northeast Asia. The general consensus of all the Northeast 
Asian countries, excluding North Korea, is to maintain a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. However, if North Korea 
continues to develop its nuclear program and no progress 
can be made in the six-party talks, it is foreseeable that 
Japan will continue to take steps towards military 
"normalization" in order to preserve its own security. The 
pace of events on the Korean Peninsula will dictate the 
speed at which Japan decides to normalize. In the short 
term, if the situation on the Korean Peninsula is not 
resolvable and North Korea decides to employ or threaten to 
employ any of its nuclear weapons, it is highly probable 
that Japan will take steps to act on its previous 
legislation to strike preemptively and would do so "within 
the legal framework" of the Japanese Constitution, as 
advocated by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko.104 This 
would be the most dangerous course, for Japan would need to 
enact emergency legislation in order to counter a threat 
from North Korea. Although most Japanese citizens would 
agree that defense of the nation would be a perfectly 
plausible reason to deploy the JSDF, a preemptive military 
operation may not be popular as seen in the meager support 
garnered when Prime Minister Koizumi backed Washington's 
bid for a preemptive attack against Iraq in March 2003.105 
The most likely situation, given North Korea's reputation 
for brinksmanship, is that the issue could drag on for some 
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time, effectively giving Japan the time it would need to 
reinterpret its Constitution, gain the public's vote and 
build up its "military." A third scenario is that the North 
Korean regime implodes before it has the chance to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons and Japan will need to find 
an alternative Northeast Asian security threat in order to 
justify its revision of the Constitution. 
2. Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction 
Although JSDF personnel are only recently beginning to 
arrive in Iraq, the implications for Japan revising its 
Constitution based on events in Iraq can also be seen in a 
short and long-term context. In the short term, the most 
dangerous event that would raise the level of debate and 
hasten a decision on Constitutional revision would be the 
death of one or any number of JSDF personnel while deployed 
to Iraq. Given the opinion poll numbers for those opposed 
to the dispatch of JSDF personnel, there are two likely 
reactions to the deaths of JSDF personnel. The first could 
be one of utter shock and a feeling of resentment towards 
the government for ignoring the concerns of the public and 
dispatching the troops regardless. This reaction would 
probably be followed by the publics' demand to withdraw the 
JSDF personnel and never allow them to be dispatched again. 
The second reaction would be the complete opposite, the 
public would be totally outraged at the death of its 
countrymen and unified in their demand that the government 
take immediate steps to allow JSDF personnel to take the 
necessary precautions and actions to protect themselves. 
Prime Minister Koizumi is hedging his bets against the 
first reaction. The JSDF personnel in Samawah are 
constructing a military camp on the outskirts of town that 
comes complete with a moat, barbed wire, only one entrance, 
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non-linear roads to deter suicide car bombers, high-tech 
sensing equipment as well as all the amenities of home 
including a gym, internet café, library, and of course a 
karaoke bar. All JSDF personnel will be confined to the 
camp unless performing their duties.106 
The long-term effects could be quite different. 
Depending on the actual duration of the reconstruction 
efforts, if JSDF personnel are routinely stationed in Iraq 
for an extended period, then the Japanese public could 
begin to experience a feeling similar to what Americans 
experienced as the Vietnam War became prolonged - one of 
uncertainty and a growing distrust of the government. 
3. Global War on Terror 
When Operation Iraqi Freedom began the world’s focus 
shifted from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iraq. While, Japan 
pledged its support to the United States immediately 
following the September 11 terror attacks, the actual 
deployment of troops to Iraq took some time and urging by 
the United States. In the short term, unless there is a 
terrorist attack on Japanese soil or an attack solely 
directed at Japan or its national interests, such as the 
troops in Iraq, it is highly unlikely that the Global War 
on Terror will incite any meaningful dialog to change the 
Constitution. However, if the frequency and intensity of 
terrorist attacks against Japan’s allies increase, then it 
is possible that Japan could come under more pressure to 
provide support to those allies. Recall, it was the 
September 11 terror attacks that sparked the emergency 
legislation allowing JMSDF units to deploy to the Indian 
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Ocean. These types of incidents could spur the talks 
required for a revision of the Constitution. 
The long-term effect of the Global War on Terror would 
be to encourage the buildup of Japan’s own security posture 
while taking steps for the JSDF to reach further beyond its 
Constitutional limits. The Global War on Terror will not be 
won in the next few years, thus giving time to Japan to 
meter its steps towards normalization. As Japan’s relations 
with other nations become stronger, they will begin to look 
to Japan as a rightful defender in both nations’ interests. 
Thus, Japan will need to take steps to defend its interests 
and its allies’ interests abroad. However, so long as 
terrorist attacks are not aimed at Japan or its allies, the 
need and desire to revise the Constitution will only be 
debated on the fringes until such time that a trigger 
brings the need for revision to the forefront. 
4. Demographics 
The "graying" of Japan over the next 20 years will 
begin to influence the ability of Japan to focus on 
Constitutional issues versus growing domestic concerns. 
According to the United Nations Population Division, the 
median age in Japan in 2025 will be over 41 years and the 
percentage of the population over 65 years will be almost 
30%.107  In addition, as a result of Japan's health care 
revolution, the life expectancy rate for Japan in 2002 is 
82 and will continue to rise to 88.1 years by the years 
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2045 - 2050.108 This would represent an incredibly difficult 
situation for Japan's financial system. Assuming that the 
U.N.'s figures are correct, this would mean that for every 
one person of retirement age 65, there would only be two 
"working age" people.109 This would present a competition 
for the government's finances – invest in the country's 
defense and security or take care of the burgeoning 
population of retired people. In addition, based on the 
U.N.'s figures, as the number of younger people decreases 
in the following years, it will be increasingly difficult 
for the JSDF to compete with open market jobs that offer 
better pay and benefits. The corollary to this is that 
while the job market, largely sponsored by the United 
States, in Japan was at its height during the Cold War, it 
has since bottomed out and the younger generation may seek 
to join the JSDF for job security and to avoid the stress 
of an uncertain job market. 
The government will need to weigh the costs and 
benefits of investing in security and neglecting the people 
or vice versa. Preferably, the government will be able to 
find a balance. In March 2000, legislation was passed to 
reform pensions by cutting the pension benefits beginning 
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in 2013 by about 20%, an increase in the age of eligibility 
from 60 to 65 and full indexation of pension increases.110  
H. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY 
 There are a number of reactions that Japan’s neighbors 
could have and any number of courses of action that they 
could take. Those reactions and courses of action will all 
depend on the circumstances of the situation that motivates 
Japan to become a normal country. The North Korean nuclear 
issue, Japan’s participation in Humanitarian Assistance and 
Iraqi Reconstruction, the Global War on Terror and Japan’s 
demographics all have long and short term effects on the 
ability of Japan to become a normal country. The intensity 
and duration of these events will dictate the pace that 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since its creation in 1950, the JSDF has taken 
incremental steps towards becoming a normal military. The 
United States can observe that Japan is making an effort to 
become “normal” and participate in additional roles and 
missions. There are several events that have occurred that 
could help in identifying to future indicators: 
-The evolution of the roles and missions of the JSDF. 
–The JSDF’s efforts to acquire new technologies and 
capabilities. 
-Shift in Japan’s domestic politics from outright 
elimination of the JSDF to marginal acceptance. 
-Recently passed legislation by the Diet to support 
JSDF operations in Iraq. 
–The actual deployment of JSDF troops to participate 
in Iraqi reconstruction efforts. 
–Japan’s statement that it would be willing to conduct 
a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if the 
threat was imminent. 
These events appear to show a trend that Japan is 
taking steps to normalize the JSDF. Future indicators that 
the JSDF is normalizing would be: 
-Outright Constitutional revision. 
–The JSDF’s participation in full military operations 
in any part of the world. 
-Japan becoming a member of any type of multilateral 
security agreement that includes collective self-
defense. 
-The LDP continuing to gain more seats while 
opposition parties continue to lose seats. 
–JSDF buildup in response to the Global War on Terror 
and the North Korean nuclear issue as well as for 
events yet to happen. 
In order for Japan to fully flex its power as a normal 
nation, it must have all the instruments of national power 
available to it - diplomatic, economic, informational and 
military. Although currently the necessity to use the 
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military as an instrument of national power is highly 
unlikely because of its strong relations in the other areas 
of national power, the potential need to use the military 
must not be overlooked. Japan's credibility in enforcing 
its foreign policy with its military is only as effective 
as its diplomatic, economic and informational arms can 
reach. Currently, if hostile action is taken against 
Japan's national interests, namely Japanese citizens and/or 
property, Japan cannot react with a strong, sustained 
military response to protect its interests abroad. 
Therefore the necessary step that Japan must take in the 
present security environment is to normalize the JSDF. 
 The factors that have been presented in this thesis 
indicate that the transformation of the JSDF has already 
begun and these indicators suggest that this process will 
continue. The rate of transformation will be shaped not 
only by world events but also by internal domestic issues. 
As long as Japan wants to be a player in the world economy, 
the United Nations Security Council, future multilateral 
security organizations and continue its favorable position 
with the United States, it is a necessity that Japan make 
itself a desirable partner with which to engage. 
Transforming the JSDF will be a historic and monumental 
step that will lead to Japan becoming a much more desirable 
trading partner, ally and friend. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Japan needs to become a normal nation and take its 
place among the world powers. The United States should 
continue to maintain and strengthen its relations with 
Japan and encourage Japan to become a normal nation. In 
order to do this the United States should increase its 
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bilateral relations with all of Japan’s neighbors to ensure 
their comfort with the idea of a normal Japan. The United 
States could also begin turning over some of its security 
duties in the Far East to Japan, thus endorsing Japan’s bid 
to be the Asian “sheriff.” The United States should use a 
“soft power” approach to its relations with the Far East 
and with Japan as a mutually cooperative ally. By 
economically, diplomatically and informatively preparing 
Japan’s neighbors for the normalization of Japan, the 
United States will ensure that they maintain a strong role 
in future Far East policy planning, decision-making and 
policy implementation. The United States would do well to 
consider that a normalized Japan that does not wish to 
maintain its ties with the United States would present an 
even stronger Far East to compete and form relations with. 
Japan plays a crucial role in the security of Northeast 
Asia and the United States needs to consider the effects of 
a normalized Japan on future United States force structure 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH AREAS 
The following are some proposed areas of research that 
have arisen out of the research conducted for this thesis.  
1. Offensive vs. defensive capabilities of the JSDF; 
are current capabilities sufficient for the JSDF’s 
stated missions? 
2. Political parties of Japan: What factors will affect 
the LDP remaining in power for the foreseeable 
future? 
3. Future force structure levels in the Asia-Pacific 
region if Japan normalizes. 
4. Potential security alliances between Japan and its 
neighbors as a result of its normalization. 
5. Prospects for the United States remaining a key 
player in Far East when Japan normalizes. 
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Such research would be useful in the context of Japan 
normalizing in ways described in this thesis.  
73 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
"A New Era in Defense." Japan Defense Agency Homepage. 
Available at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm 
Accessed 10 October 2003. 
 
"Awakening Japan's sleeping defense giant." Asia Times, 
Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html 
Accessed 10 November 2003. 
 
"China to boost military strength, build high-tech 
weapons." Channel News Asia, 5 March 2004. Available 
at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific
/view/73984/1/.html Accessed 5 March 2004. 
 
"First group of core GSDF troops arrives in Kuwait." The 
Japan Times, 4 February 2004. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040205a3.htm Accessed 4 
February 2004. 
 
"First Taepodong 1 Launch Carried A Satellite." Jane's 
Missiles and Rockets. 01-Oct-1998, EDITION: 1998, 
VOLUME/ISSUE: 002/010. 
 
"GSDF convoy to pass through Kuwait City." The Japan Times, 
13 January 2004. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040113a3.htm Accessed 13 
January 2004. 
 
"Japan confirms troop dispatch to help rebuild Iraq." 
Agence France Press, 12 November 2003. Available at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific
/view/60008/1/.html Accessed 02 December 2003. 
 
"Japan must risk danger in sending troops to Iraq." Agence 
France Press, 02 December 2003. Available at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific
/view/60034/1/.html Accessed 02 December 2003. 
 
"Japan, N Korea discuss kidnapped," BBC News, 11 February 
2004 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/3478835.stm Accessed 15 March 2004. 
74 
"Koizumi must deliver before hoopla fades." The Japan 
Times, 24 May 2001. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20010524b2.htm Accessed 2 January 
2004 
 
"Koizumi pledges to back U.S. despite opposition to Iraq 
War." Mainichi Daily News, 5 March 2003. Available at 
http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-
news/899078/Koizumi20pledges20to20back20U2eS2e20despit
e20opposition20to20Iraq20war20-0-1.html Accessed 6 
March 2004. 
 
"Koizumi's shrine visits derail Japanese bid for China rail 
project." Channel News Asia, 18 February 2004. 
Available at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/eastasia/ 
Accessed 18 February 2004. 
 
"LDP candidates all favor revisions to Constitution." The 
Japan Times, 14 September 2003. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.kp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030914a1.htm1/12/04  Accessed 2 
January 2004. 
 
"Morning in Japan Again: Constitutional Reform." The Japan 
Times, 25 April 2001. 
 
"No capitulation, no food: Komura to Pyongyang." The Japan 
Times, 13 August 1999. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn19990813a4.htm Accessed 18 
February 2004. 
 
"Re-elected Koizumi faces first test over Iraq dispatch." 
Agence France Press, 11 November 2003. Accessed 11 
November 2003. 
 
"SDF terrorism response joins war emergency bills." The 
Japan Times,4 February 2004. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-







"SDP set for about-face on JSDF." The Japan Times, 7 
December 2000. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20001207a5.htm  Accessed 2 
January 2004. 
 
"SDP, JCP setbacks spell trouble for Constitution." The 
Japan Times, 11 November 2003. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20031111b1.htm Accessed 2 January 
2004. 
 
"South Korea, Japan Sending Troops to Iraq." Reuters, 01 
December 2003. 
 
"What is Transformation?" USJFCOM: About Transformation. 
Available athttp://www.jfcom.mil/about/transform.html 
Accessed 10 November 2003. 
 
Beasley, W.G. The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic 
and Social Change Since 1850. (New York: St. Martin's 
Press 2000). 
 
Bellows, Michael D., ed. Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving 
Strategic Priorities. Washington D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 1994. 
 
Boyd, Alan "Awakening Japan's sleeping defense giant." Asia 
Times. Available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html Accessed 10 
November 2003. 
 
________. “UN’s Elite Club A Closed Shop.” Global Policy 
Forum. Available at 
http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/reform/cluster1/2
003/0503elite.htm Accessed 18 February 2004. 
 
Curtin, J Sean. "Japan's 'Fortress of Solitude' in Iraq-
plus karaoke." Asia Times Online, 20 February 2004. 
Available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FB19Dh05.html 
Accessed 20 February 2004. 
 
Defense Agency, Japan. Defense Program for FY2003: An 
Overview. 
 
Defense of Japan 2000, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2000. 
76 
 
Defense of Japan 2001, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2001. 
 
Defense of Japan 2002, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002. 
 
Defense of Japan 2003, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2003. 
 
Dowty, Alan. “Japan and The Middle East: Signs Of Change?” 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, 
No. 4, December 2000. Available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/2000/issue
4/dowty.pdf Accessed 3 December 2003. 
 
DPJ web site, Available at 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html  
Accessed 30 November 2003. 
 
Ellings, Richard J. and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. Strategic 
Asia 2003-2004: Fragility and Crisis. Seattle: The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003. 
 
Germinsky, Robert A. The Divine Wind: Japanese Kamikazes. 
Washington, D.C.: Navy & Marine Corps WWII 
Commemorative Committee, 1993. 
 
Greimel, Hans. "Japan Answers U.S. Call for Aid in Iraq." 
Yahoo! New, 15 October 2003. Available at 
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/2003
1015/ap_on_re_mi_ea/japan_iraq_6 Accessed 15 October 
2003. 
 
Halloran, Richard. "Japan departs from pacifist stance, 
plans two aircraft carriers." The Straits Times, 16 
July 2003. Available at 
http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/storyprintfriendly/0,
1887,199865,00.html? Accessed 16 July 2003. 
 
Hanson, Richard. "Japan, ASEAN celebrate 30-year 
relationship." Asia Times Online, 13 December 2003. 
Available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EL13Dh04.html 
Accessed 14 December 2003. 
 
Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2000. 
 
77 
McIntosh, Malcolm. Japan Re-armed. New York: St. Martin's 
Press 1986. 
 
Miller, Lyman "China’s National Party Leadership." March 1, 
2003. Available at 
http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/references/leade
rs2003.pdf Accessed 21 February 2004. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, “China's Views on the Development of 
Multipolarization.” 18 August 2003. Available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24880.htm 
Accessed 6 March 2004. 
 
Miyachi, Shinobu. "Korea-Japan military ties take the heat 
off US" Asia Times Online,  18 November 1999. 
Available at http://www.atimes.com/japan-
econ/AK18Dh02.html Accessed 15 March 2004. 
 
Mühleisen, Martin and Hamid Fauqee. "Japan: Population 
Aging and the Fiscal Challenge." Finance & 
Development, March 2001. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/muhl
eise.htm Accessed 6 March 2004. 
 
Nabeshima, Keizo. "In the wake of the spy boats." The Japan 
Times, 7 April 1999. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?eo19990407a2.htm Accessed 18 
February 2004. 
 
New Komeito web site, Available at 
http://www.komei.or.jp/kensaku_files/english/basicpoli
cy.htm Accessed 30 November 2003. 
 
Olsen, Edward A. U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-
Internationalist View. Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1985. 
 
Patterson, Torkel. Future Roles and Missions of the Japan 
self-Defense Forces, Prepared for a conference: 
Restructuring U.S Japan Relations. Okazaki 






Paul, James. “As Reform Negotiations Reach Fever Pitch, 
Germany & Japan Push For Permanent Security Council 
Seats.” Global Policy Forum. Available at 
http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/reform/secref97.h
tm Accessed 18 February 2004. 
 
Preliminary Report on Petroleum Statistics, Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry. Available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/index.html 
Accessed 3 December 2003. 
 
President Chen's Press Conference, Presidential Statement, 
Press Conference, February 3, 2004. Available at 
http://www.president.gov.tw/php-
bin/docset/showenews.php4?_section=5&_rid=1598 
Accessed 28 February 2004. 
 
Rhee, Sang-Woo and Tae-Hyo Kim, ed. Korea-Japan Security 
Relations. Seoul: Oruem, 2000. 
 
Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander 
Losyukov's Interview with ITAR-TASS News Agency on the 
Questions of Russian-Japanese Relations. 13 February 
2004. Available at 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/31C7E29150FB4F38C3256E
390051C54C?OpenDocument Accessed 6 March 2004. 
 
Scanlon, Charles. "N Korea confesses to kidnappings." BBC 
News, 17 September 2002. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk./2/hi/asia-pacific/2262074.stm 
Accessed 20 February 2003. 
 
Schoppa, Leonard. "Japanese Domestic Politics: The 
Challenge of Turning off the Cruise Control". Foreign 
Policy Research Institute, Professor Schoppa spoke on 
this topic at FPRI’s History Institute on Teaching 
About Japan, October 19-22, 2003. 
 
The Constitution of Japan. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Foreign Policy. 
Available at 






The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic 
Bluebook 2003. Available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap2
-a.pdf Accessed 5 March 2004. 
 
The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan. East 
Asian Strategic Review 2002. Tokyo: The National 
Institute for Defense Studies, 2002. 
United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs. "World Population Chart 2002." 
Available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2002/
POP-R2002-DATA_Web.xls Accessed 6 March 2004. 
 
United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs. "LONG-RANGE POPULATION 
PROJECTIONS." 21 August 2003. Available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrang
e/long-range_working-paper_final.PDF Accessed 6 March 
2004. 
 
United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs. "World Population Prospect: The 
2002 Revision Population Database" Available at 























 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Professor Edward A. Olsen 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Associate Professor Michael T. McMaster 
Naval War College 
Monterey, California 
 
5. CAPT Thomas E. Mangold 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Strategy and 
 Concepts (N513) 
Washington, DC 
 
6. LtCol Stephen E. Duke 
Asia/Pacific Desk Officer, PLU-1, PP&O, HQMC 
Washington, DC 
 
7. LCDR Joe Carrigan 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Strategy and 
 Concepts (N513) 
Washington, DC 
 
8. LCDR Cliff Moran 
Organization of Addressee 
Washington, DC 
 
9. John Rhee 
Pebble Beach, California 
